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government informers with severe, or even strict, constitutional proscrip-
tions, provided the informer's activities do not directly conflict with con-
stitutional safeguards. It is possible that Massiah v. United States," instead
of indicating with substantial certainty that informer tactics and tech-
niques will meet increased judicial opposition, will be limited to its facts.
Thus, while law enforcement agencies may see their procurement methods
circumscribed in the future, probably no countervailing constitutional
proscriptions, other than those already in force and necessary to insure
proper observance of constitutional safeguards, will be placed upon future
utilization of informers.
Albert D. Hoppe
Informed Consent - A New Basis of Medical Liability
in Texas
Scott suffered a loss of hearing as a result of an unsuccessful operation
performed by Dr. Wilson. In his suit for damages Scott did not allege
negligence in the diagnosis and recommendation of the operation nor in
the performance of the operation. His contention was that Dr. Wilson
failed to inform him that there was a one per cent possibility of total loss
of hearing in all such operations and that because of the lack of informa-
tion he was unable to give an informed consent to the treatment. The court
of civil appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's instructed ver-
dict for Dr. Wilson1 and on Wilson's appeal the Texas Supreme Court
Held, affirmed: An action in malpractice is shown when a physician or
surgeon fails to disclose what a reasonable medical practitioner of the same
school and under the same or similar circumstances would have disclosed
to his patient about the risks incident to a proposed diagnosis or treatment.
Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Medical malpractice has usually been predicated on the law of assault
and battery or upon principles of negligence.! If a doctor acts upon a
patient without the patient's consent, he is guilty of a battery' unless an
emergency preludes the doctor from obtaining consent.' Consent may be
62 See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
1 Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
"See generally, McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN. L. REv. 381 (1957); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 549 (1959).
'Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Gregoris
v. Manos, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 279, 40 N.E.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1941); Hivey v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588,
253 P. 363 (1927).
4 Jackovach v. Yokum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d
474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (courts are stricter in determining whether emergency exists when re-
productive organs are involved); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 62 (1934).
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express,' implied in fact,' or implied in law.' If consent is obtained by
fraud or misrepresentation, the physician may still be liable for a battery.!
Likewise, the doctor may be liable if consent is obtained from one not
authorized to give consent.! Finally, if the physician has received consent
to perform a certain operation but extends the operation, he may be liable
for a battery." Malpractice predicated on negligence may arise when the
physician has not exercised reasonable care in compliance with a medical
standard, determined by the standard of the same school" and locality,12
in diagnosis, treatment or post-treatment."
II. INFORMED CONSENT AS ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Recently another basis of liability for medical malpractice has become
available. 4 Generally referred to as lack of "informed consent," it began
as an extension of the rules of assault and battery.1 The rationale behind
the action was that unless the physician adequately informed the patient
of the dangers involved in an operation, the patient was unable to reach
an intelligent decision. Thus, any consent given was a nullity." Although
all the early cases on "informed consent" were based upon the principles
'Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953); Meek v. Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276
P. 30 (1929) (amputation of leg despite objection of patient); Samuelson v. Taylor, 160 Wash.
369, 295 P. 113 (1931) (mistake as to identity of patient).
6 McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
7Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
'Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916); Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23
(1911); Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948); Paulsen v. Gundersen,
218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
'Where patient is a minor: Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (consent of par-
ents necessary to operate on minor); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936); Moss v.
Rishworth. 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920); RFSTATEMFNT OF TORTS § 59 (1934).
But see Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926) (not battery where the minor is
capable of understanding the nature of the operation and the risks involved); Baker v. Welsh, 144
Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906) (same); Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953)
(where patient is mentally incapacitated); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (same).
'°Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891);
Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Hondley v. St. Francis Hospital, 161 Cal. App.
2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (con-
sent to operate on left ear but operated on right ear as well); Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) ("a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages"); Rolater v. Strain, 39
Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) (consent to operation on foot with the express agreement that no
bones would be removed-doctor removed a bone); Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866
(1949); Powell, Consent to Ofierative Procedures, 21 MD. L. Ruv. 189 (1961). But see Preston v.
Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P.2d 113 (1948); Douglas v. Johnson, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d
504 (1944); Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Kennedy v. Parrott,
243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956), Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
"For interpretation of "school" see Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893).
"For interpretation of "locality" see Stallcup v. Coscarant, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955);
Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. R. 363 (1880); Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378,
293 P.2d 766 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 166 (3d ed. 1964); 41 AM. JUR. Physicians
Surgeons S 82 (1942).
iaGoheen v. Graber, 181 Kan. 107, 309 P.2d 636 (1957); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368,
54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Benson v. Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921); Groce v. Myers,
224 N.C. 165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
'Actually, the inspiration for this action came from Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96
S.E. 360 (1918).
5 See generally, Hirsh, Informed Consent to Treatment, Medico-legal Comment, 176 J.A.M.A.
436 (1961).
'
6 Salgo v. Stanford, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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of battery, 17 the courts were aware of the discrepancies of such a classifi-
ation. The cases have pointed out that while the theory of "informed con-
sent" has overtones of assault and battery, since consent is so intimate with
that action, there are distinct drawbacks to such a classification. 8 Most
apparent, the physician has consent to do exactly what he does; he neither
extends nor deviates from the touchings which have been authorized.
Equally disturbing is the fact that nominal damages may be awarded in
battery actions even though the plaintiff may be unable to prove actual
damages. 9 Moreover, most jurisdictions do not require proof of the doctor's
duty of care by expert testimony in assault and battery cases,"0 whereas
such expert testimony is required to establish a standard of disclosure for a
suit claiming lack of informed consent." For these reasons later cases have
accepted the view that the proper tort basis for an action of "informed
consent" is negligence."
III. INFORMED CONSENT AS NEGLIGENCE
Today the majority of jurisdictions which recognize the action of "in-
formed consent" predicate liability upon principles of negligence. Natan-
son v. Kline" is the most cited and best representative of the cases which
have adopted the theory of negligence. There the Supreme Court of Kansas
determined that the doctor has a duty to disclose the risks and dangers
which might result from a proposed operation or treatment in conform-
'"Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957); WaIl v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1943); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963); Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173
(1955). But see the very recent case Gray v. Gunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966) which
based its decision on principles of assault and battery.
'"Salgo v. Stanford University, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) is the best repre-
sentative of these cases.
'"Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1953); Butler v. Molinski, 198 Tenn.
124, 277 S.W.2d 448 (1955); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 9, at 31-32 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 18 (1934).
"
0 Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963); Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148
S.E. 659 (1929); Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930).
25 For argument advocating a professional standard as established by expert testimony in all
malpractice cases, see McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957).
22Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453
(Alas. 1964); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on appeal, 2
Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (calls the action "malpractice," so unclear which tort action
is based on); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181
So. 2d 226 (Fla. App. 1965); Russell v. Harwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. App. 1964); Grosjean v.
Spencer, 140 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1966); Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964),
modified on appeal, 194 Kan. 675, 401 P.2d 659 (1965); Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379
P.2d 292 (1963); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified on rehearing, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963),
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1330 (1965); Miles v. Van Gelder, 1 Mich. App. 522, 137 N.W.2d 292
(Cc. App. 1965); Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d
1017 (1961); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962) (terms the action "mal-
practice" without further qualification); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 18 N.Y.2d 908, 223 N.E.2d 46
(1966); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958), Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 331
(1960); Dirossi v. Wein, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623, 212 N.E.2d 447 (App. Div. 1965); Watson v. Clutts,
262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Ore. 196, 400 P.2d 234 (1965);
Block v. McVay, 126 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1964); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P. 421 (Wyo. 1962);
Kenny v. Lockwood, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 906, rev'd, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 506.
2 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
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ance with a medical standard established by expert testimony. For the
doctor to be liable there must be a breach of this duty which results in
proximately caused injuries.
One drawback to classification as negligence is the continued use of
the battery rationale of informed consent. A null consent is foreign to an
action in negligence. Nevertheless, a negligence basis may be justified be-
cause a failure to disclose the risks and dangers inherent in a proposed
operation unreasonably places the patient in an unsuspected position of
danger. Since complete and full disclosure of all inherent and collateral
risks might itself be malpractice because of the effect such disclosures
might have on the patient,' the use of a professional standard to define
the extent of duty is justified. When a patient voluntarily places himself
within the area of risk, assumption of risk is a defence. But assumption
of risk only applies to the risk of which the patient is aware and therefore
does not excuse the physician for failure to sufficiently inform."'
Duty To Inform. The duty to inform the patient of risks involved in
an operation has long been recognized." It arises out of the doctor-patient
relationship"7 and derives further impetus from the doctrine of inviola-
bility of the person." Although the courts have had no difficulty recog-
nizing the existence of this duty, the most critical aspect of the new action
deals with the extent of that duty. At first the courts required full dis-
closure,2 but it was soon realized that disclosure of all risks was unwork-
able." Such a requirement was too much of a burden on physicians. As one
case points out, it is impossible to inform the patient "not only of the
known risks but also of each infinitesimal, imaginative, or speculative
element that would go into making up such risks." 1 Furthermore, most
24Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
SHalepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963), on remand, 376 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).26 As early as 1919 in the case of Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918) the
duty was recognized. In that case the defendant doctor misrepresented the dangers of an operation
and was found liable for his negligence. But that court said mere failure to disclose was not negli-
gent; misrepresentation was requisite for liability.
" Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101-02, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). "The relationship between the physician and his patient is a fiduciary
one, and therefore the physician has an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient
of all pertinent facts related to his illness." Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816
(1956); Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Berry v. Moench, 8
Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VANo. L. REV. 549, 586-91 (1959).
"SMohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
2
aSalgo v. Stanford, 154 Cal. App. 2d $60, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) suggests that all risks
should be disclosed unless the doctor is justified in not so disclosing; Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1
D.L.R. 507, said it was the duty of a doctor to "enlighten the patient's mind in a plain and rea-
sonable way as to what her ailment was, as to what were the risks of operating promptly, what
were the risks of delaying the operation, and what were the risks of not operating at all." In Bang
v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958), the court held that the
defendant doctor was obligated to explain all the risks in the proposed operation, but this case
involved the tying off of a patient's spermatic cords in connection with one of two alternative
treatments available to the patient.
3 9Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960).
3' Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982, 991 (1964), modified on appeal, 194 Kan. 675,
401 P.2d 659 (1965).
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courts recognize that full disclosure might cause undue apprehension on
the part of the patient, causing him either to forego a needed operation
or react unfavorably to an operation which might otherwise be successful
because of fear that the risks might materialize."a Also many patients
might not understand even if all the risks were disclosed. Most importantly,
however, is the fact that the risks connected with most treatments are so
remote and materialize with such infrequency that it is in the patient's
best interests not to have such a disclosure loom as a major factor in his
decision. The patient is the primary concern of the physician and if dis-
closure of a minute risk might unduly sway the patient from recovery
or cure, then it is the physician's duty not to disclose.a" In view of these
considerations it is generally recognized that the extent of disclosure is
a medical judgment.
Professional Medical Standard. Thus, virtually all jurisdictions which have
dealt with informed consent have adopted the Natanson requirement of
duty that does not go beyond the professional medical standard as proved
by expert medical testimony. There is an important exception to this
general rule. Some courts have taken judicial notice that there are inherent
dangers in a certain operation or treatment.' Strong dicta in Natanson
suggested that where there is no disclosure in a case evidencing a recog-
nized danger in connection with a certain operation, no expert testimony
as to a professional standard is required.' But where there is some dis-
closure of risks, whether the operation has recognized dangers or not,
expert evidence must show that the disclosures are inadequate according
to the professional standard.
The existence of the general rule requiring the establishment of a pro-
fessional standard by expert evidence where there is a disclosure, although
in the doctor's favor, creates as many difficulties as it solves. Since the
plaintiff has the burden to establish the duty owed by the doctor, then
the plaintiff has the burden to establish the professional standard. But at
best the plaintiff can show only the objective professional standard: what
a reasonable practitioner would disclose to an average patient. And yet
the primary purpose in requiring a professional standard is to allow the
" Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Watson v. Clutts,
262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wash. 2d 867, 271 P.2d 705
(1954); See generally Smith, Therapeutic Privilege To Withhold Special Diagnosis From Patient Sick
with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349 (1946).
"See Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445, 1447 (1962).
" Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (holding that a thyroidectomy is known
universally to include a risk to the recurrent laryngeal nerves); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
350 P.2d 1093, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
"Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified on 'rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1017
(1961). The Missouri court was quick to note, however, in its next "informed consent" case, Aiken
v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), that in cases where there had been some disclosure, as
opposed to no disclosure, expert testimony as to a professional standard will be required. According
to Natanson it is only when the facts concerning the actual disclosures made to the patient are
ascertained or ascertainable by the trier of the facts, that the expert testimony of expert witnesses
is required to establish whether such disclosures are in accordance with those which a reasonable
medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.
1967]
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doctor to take the individual patient's physical and mental status into
account when deciding how much disclosure should be made in the pa-
tient's best interests. This is a subjective medical judgment but still ap-
parently within the element of duty. Plaintiff will be unable to prove by
expert testimony that the subjective judgment of the doctor does not
justify incomplete disclosure unless the plaintiff can produce a qualified
expert witness who is as well acquainted with the plaintiff's particular needs
as the defendant was at the time of the decision. The courts have had
difficulty in solving this problem. The case of Woods v. Brumlop6 prob-
ably came closest to a workable solution when it suggested that, after an
objective standard has been established by expert testimony, the defend-
ant doctor may offer evidence which takes the individual patient or cir-
cumstances into consideration and provides an exception to the professional
standard. But this in reality places on the doctor part of the plaintiff's
burden of proving the extent of duty. Other cases"7 divide the duty into
two areas, objective and subjective, but fail to prescribe who shall assume
the burden of proof in each area. Although these courts classify the sub-
jective area as "duty," they have apparently not seen the impossibility of
having the plaintiff prove that his doctor's subjective considerations were
erroneous when in most cases he is unaware of what those considerations
were.
Even if there were no subjective test required in the new action, a purely
objective standard may be too vague to provide the doctor with a legal
guideline. At present there is no way in which a doctor may be sure his
disclosures conform to those of the profession. The trend of recent cases
suggests that medical associations, to protect their members, will be forced
to provide standard "risk" forms for every type of operation."8 A problem
still might arise when the proposed operation is experimental or relatively
new and no professional standard has been established." The new cause of
action might tend to discourage a consideration of the individual patient
and the use of experimental operations, two primary concerns of the medi-
cal profession and public alike.
Expert Medical Testimony. In all cases, except possibly those which will
not require the establishment of a professional standard,"0 expert testimony
30 Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (1962) lists as exceptions to the pro-
fessional standard, (1) emergency, (2) full disclosure may alarm the patient, (3) each patient is
to be treated as a separate problem and in some cases the doctor should have discretion in the
amount of disclosure. The court said, "A doctor who fails to so advise his client, or gives an
untrue answer as to such consequences is liable for malpractice unless his failure to do so comes
within one of the exceptions to the rule requiring candor and disclosure.
" DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961) is the best representative of
the cases. It said, "Whether or not a physician or surgeon is under a duty to warn a patient of the
possibility of a specific adverse result of a proposed treatment depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and of the general practice with respect to such cases followed by the medical pro-
fession in the locality."
"SSee A.M.A. LAw DEP'T, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS WITH LEGAL ANALYSIS 19 (1961) (advising
disclosure of all unexpected hazards in light of recent cases).
3 9 Fiorentino v. Wenger, 18 N.Y.2d 908, 223 N.E.2d 46 (1966). The court held that where
the defendant doctor was the only one in the country using a particular type of operation, he had
a duty to inform patient's mother of the novel and unorthodox nature of the operation.
40 See note 39 supra.
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will have to be produced by the plaintiff."1 There are difficulties involved in
this burden beyond those already discussed. In cases where the operation is
comparatively new and few doctors are qualified to testify as experts, great
expense might be involved in producing a qualified witness." There is also
the recurring problem of getting one doctor to state that his colleague
failed to adhere to the professional standard."3
Other Elements of the Action. The other elements of the action are
similar in most respects to conventional medical malpractice cases. Whether
the defendant physician departed from the practice of the profession
(breach of duty) is a lay question which requires no expert testimony.
Most cases which have considered the problem of proximate cause have
required an allegation that the plaintiff would not have consented to the
operation had he known of the risks involved." No cases have required
anything further but this may be because most of the cases reported to
date have primarily involved the question of duty. It is anticipated that
proximate cause will cause as much trouble to the courts as the element
of duty already has. Proof of this element will usually be offered in the
form of plaintiff's own testimony and the defendant will probably be
able to disprove such evidence only by impeachment or through the in-
congruity of the allegation to the circumstance. '
IV. WILSON V. SCOTT
The Wilson decision has provided Texas plaintiffs with a new basis for
recovery in malpractice. The nature of this action was ill-defined in other
jurisdictions when Texas adopted it; the decision in Wilson adds nothing
in clarification. The problems discussed above in connection with duty,
professional standard, burden of proof, expert testimony, and proximate
cause were adopted in Texas along with the action. The court did not seek
to solve any of these problems for future litigants. In fact, although couch-
ing its decision in terms of negligence and upon the reasoning of Natanson,
the court refused to say that the action could not be brought under prin-
ciples of assault and battery. 6 This may have the effect of revitalizing a
question which most jurisdictions have long since answered.
4 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393 ,350 P.2d 1093, modified on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967). Decisions holding that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in "informed consent" cases are: DiFilippo v. Preston,
53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Miles v. Van Gelder, 1 Mich. App. 522, 137 N.W.2d 292
(1965); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 243 N.C. 51, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
' See Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv.
250 (1956).
43 Id.
"Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on appeal, 2 Ariz. App.
607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,
203 N.E.2d 469 (1964); But see Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964)
which held that such evidence is inadmissible. The court excluded this evidence which "presented
a case of looking backward. To permit the plaintiff to change the decision afterwards is equivalent
to looking at the answer without solving the problem."
4Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965). One instance where a jury might find no proxi-
mate cause despite plaintiff's allegation and proof that he wouldn't have consented to the operation
had there been full disclosure is the case of a terminal illness or where the patient is so seriously ill
that an operation is necessary to save or prolong his life.
"'Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967).
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